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Michael F. Del Casino
Regulatory Division Manager

Suite 1000
1120 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
202 457-2023
FAX 202 457-2165

March 24, 1999
Final

Mr. Dale Hatfield
Chief, Office of Engineering and Technology
Federal Communications Commission
2000 M Street NW, Suite 480
Washington, DC 20554

Dear Mr. Hatfield:

As required by Part 63.100(a) of the Commissions Rules, AT&T hereby files its Final Service Disruption Report for an AT&T Local Services network outage.

1. DATE / INCIDENT LOCATION TIME:

February 22, 1999, 10:05 AM CST

2. GEOGRAPHICAL AREA AFFECTED:

Dallas, TX

3. CUSTOMERS AFFECTED (APPROXIMATELY):

159,245 (based on blocked calls)

4. TYPES OF SERVICES AFFECTED:

Toll Access, Toll Completing and OSPS

5. DURATION OF OUTAGE:

4 hours 5 minutes

6. BLOCKED CALLS:



7A. CAUSE OF INCIDENT:

While performing an infrastructure rearrangement at the Dallas, TX central office, a Dallas city operations vendor (Conquest) inadvertently disconnected the wrong two DSX3 shelves because they were mislabeled. These shelves were assigned to a ring that carried live Point of Presence (POP) to Local Serving Office (LSO) service for the AT&T core network. The vendor was attempting to re-terminate DSX3 shelves serving another ring that was turned up, but not carrying live traffic.

7B. EQUIPMENT NAME / TYPE:

Central Office Equipment

7C. PART OF NETWORK:

Dallas, TX – Dallas, TX

8. RESTORATION METHODS:

Initially, AT&T Local Services (ALS) dispatched a technician and supervisor to re-terminate the failed DSX3 shelves. Progressive attempts to restore customer service were impeded by the complication of the mislabeled shelves.

9. STEPS TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE:

1. The outside vendor was performing work on live equipment without a MOP. Immediately following the outage, Dallas city operations reviewed the work process with all city technicians.
2. Because the outside vendor did not follow the ALS process by working in an ALS area without ALS supervision, ALS terminated its contract with such vendor.
3. The DS3 circuits were not monitored at the DSX to ensure the circuits were not carrying live traffic prior to performing the work. On a going forward basis, in similar situations, the ALS policy would be to monitor the DSX to ensure that the circuits are not carrying live traffic. Dallas city operations verbally reviewed this documented process for circuit disconnects/re-terminations with all applicable technicians.
4. The Point of Terminations (POTS) bay was installed by another Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) and labeled incorrectly. Additionally, the shelves were installed by the LEC on a non-standard configuration contributing to the confusion. Immediately after the outage, the POTS bay stenciling was corrected and Dallas city operations

will work with the ALS Network Realization group to ensure that on a going forward basis all bays are installed per the standard configuration.


10. APPLICABLE BEST PRACTICES:

AT&T has reviewed SECTION D – DIGITAL CROSS-CONNECT SYSTEMS in the **Network Reliability: A Report to the Nation, June 1993.** Based on the root cause of this outage, AT&T - ALS is in complete support of the following countermeasures and best practices to prevent future incidents.

6.1.2 DCS Installation, Upgrade, Growth, and Maintenance Activities: Because of the potential for service impact in many activities, ALS needs to more thoroughly prepare for the work and do a better job of reviewing procedures prior to work commencing. One method becoming more prevalent is to establish a “Change Management” group to act as a customer advocate, enforce the requirement for proper MOPs for each maintenance action, and manage network activity as well.

6.2.11 Methods of Procedures: Positive reinforcement of procedures should be stressed at all times. The use of signs designating various work areas, labels on equipment and cabling, properly identified inventory storage area, log sheets for work performed, and procedures to be followed in case of emergencies is posted. In addition, certification programs should be started to ensure that technicians have been properly trained to perform critical tasks.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. D. Cairns". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.